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TAXATION - FEDERAL INCOME TAX - EvASION THROUGH UsE OF THE
CORPORATE ENTITY - The taxpayer purchased A Company stock from X
£or $IOo,ooo and later sold it for $7,500, deducting the loss in his tax return
for that year. Following the discovery of fraud on the part of X he reacquired
the stock for $8,000 and then negotiated a settlement with X providing for a
resale to X for $100,000. To avoid high taxes on the resulting profit, the
taxpayer organized B corporation and purchased all its stock. He then sold to it
the A Company stock and all his claims against X in return for its promise to
pay back the $100,000 in forty annual installments. On the following day the
taxpayer, acting as the agent of B corporation, sold the A Company stock and
released the tort claim to X for $ I 00,000. The B corporation remained in
existence, making the installment payments and engaging in investment transactions. Contending that the entire gain from the sale was income to the taxpayer, the commissioner determined a deficiency which was not sustained by the
board of tax appeals. The circuit court of appeals reversed, and on certiorari
to United States Supreme Court, held, the sale should be considered as the
taxpayer's and hence the gain should be taxable to him. Griffiths v. Helvering,
308 U.S. 355, 60 S. Ct. 277 (1939).
Courts generally say they will respect the corporate entity in the field of
taxation.1 Yet they often disregard it. 2 To determine under what circumstances
they will respect it and under what circumstances they will disregard it is a
difficult problem.8 Several principles have been developed that will sustain a
decision either way without any accurate tests for the application of these
principles. When the court wishes to disregard the corporate entity, it need only
say that in the field of taxation courts look at the substance of the transactions
the parties have carried out and disregard the particular forms they have gone
through. 4 On the other hand, when the court wishes to uphold the corporate
entity, it will repeat the well recognized entity doctrines and say that the taxpayer's motive of avoiding taxes is immaterial since every taxpayer has the right
to arrange his affairs in such manner as to minimize his taxes. 5 Hence the real
difficulty in a given case arises in trying to determine which set of principles
will be applied. In the principal case the Court chose to disregard the elaborate
scheme of the taxpayer, which had as its purpose the evasion 6 of the high
1 Burnet v. Clark, 287 U. S. 410, 53 S. Ct. 207 (1932); Lynch v. Hornby,
247 U. S. 339, 38 S. Ct. 543 (1918); 5 PAUL and MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION, § 53.20 (1934).
2 S. A. Macqueen Co. v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 3d, 1933) 67 F. (2d) 857;
United States v. Barwin Realty Co., (D. C. N. Y. 1928) 25 F. (2d) 1003.
8 See Finkelstein, "The Corporate Entity and the Income Tax," 44 YALE L. J.
436 (1935).
4 "Fictional corporate camouflage cannot be made the device to escape taxation."
North Jersey Title Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 3d, 1936) 84 F. (2d) 898
at 901. Accord: Kaspare Cohn Co., 35 B. T. A. 646 at 665 (1937); Groves v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) 99 F. (2d) 179.
5 Jones v. Helvering, 63 App. D. C. 204, 71 F. (2d) 214 (1934); Fruit Belt
Telephone Co. v. Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 440 (1931). For a collection of cases
on the effect of the taxpayer's motive to avoid taxes, see IOI A. L. R. 204 (1936).
6 The term "evasion" is used, since the scheme was actually held to be unlawful.
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surtaxes on the $92,000 capital gain through the use of the corporate entity as
an instrumentality to spread out the distribution over a period of forty years. The
case came within the broad principle of Gregory v. Helvering,1 which applies
the test of whether the use of the corporate entity had any business purpose other
than the tax purpose. Where the" corporation has been dissolved after the tax
purpose has been accomplished, it is clear that the corporation has not served a
business purpose. 8 However, where the corporation has gone on engaging in
security transactions and other lawful businesses, the court is compelled to look
at the nature of the particular transaction. The principal case is significant in that
the Court recognized that the motive of the taxpayer becomes material when the
Court is determining whether to disregard the form and follow the substance of
a particular transaction.11 Under this view, regardless of the past or future use
of the corporation, if the sale to it and subsequent resale be merely part of a
plan to evade taxes which would result from a direct transfer, they will be
regarded as a direct sale by the taxpayer to the third person for purposes of
taxation. 10 The Court could have based its decision in the principal case on a
wholly different ground. The use of the corporation was simply a method to
keep this capital gain from vesting for an instant in the taxpayer, and to deflect
it immediately over to B company. This is essentially a case of deflection of
income in which the taxpayer attempted to "attribute the fruits to a different
tree from that on which they grew" within the principle of Lucas v. Earl.11
There have been many instances of this practice in husband-wife cases 12 and in
transactions between a corporation and its stockholders.13 The cases on this
principle are in state of confusion,14 but the true view seems to be that where
a person has performed everything necessary upon his part to receive income,
he should not be permitted to enter into an agreement with another to deflect
the income to that other person and thus avoid taxes.
G. Randall Price
If it had been held to be permitted within the law, the term "avoidance" would be the
proper description of the result. Thus the two terms merely serve as labels for the legal
result reached. For a further understanding of the terms, see Buck, "Income Tax
Evasion and Avoidance: Some General Considerations," 25 GEORGETOWN L. J. 863
(1937).
.
1 293 U.S. 465, 55 S. Ct. 266 (1935).
8 Electrical Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) 92 F. (2d)
593. See also 37 MxcH. L. REv. 679 (1939).
9 The language of Justice Frankfurter in the principal case plainly shows that the
motive of the taxpayer is material: "That was the crux of the business to Griffiths, and
that is the crux of the business to us." 308 U. S. at 357.
10 There are many cases where the reverse situation is presented. The corporation
is about to make an advantageous sale, so it transfers the property to its stockholders,
who then proceed to sell it in order to escape the corporate income tax. Boggs-Burnham
& Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B. T. A. 988 (1932), and cases collected in IOI A. L. R.
205 at 208 (1936).
11 281 U.S. III at II5, 50 S. Ct. 241 (1930).
12 Washington v. Commissioner, 30 B. T. A. 788 ( 1934); Daugherty v. Commissioner, 24 B. T. A. 531 (1931). For a collection of cases, see 83 A. L. R. 88 (1933).
1 s.Dickey v. Burnet, (C. C. A. 8th, 1932) 56 F. (2d) 917, and cases collected
in 101 A. L. R. 204 (1936).
14 See Buck, "Income Tax Evasion and Avoidance: The Deflection of Income,"
23 VA. L. REV. 107 (1936), 265 (1937).

